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Anxious about the failure of decisionmakers to significantly reduce 'the human impact' on Earth, many
global change researchers are looking for ways and means to influence public policy, business strategy
and civil society more strongly. As part of this, there is a greater emphasis on understanding and altering
the 'human dimensions' of global environmental change. A number of physical and society-environment
geographers are involved in this endeavour, building on some valuable past achievements. But what lies
ahead? I address this question by examining the rich idea of a 'social contract' - one little used in
disciplinary debates about Geography's past, present and future, but now relatively common in certain
wider discussions of anthropogenic global change. I suggest that there are currents of thinking in
contemporary Geography that can offer something both new and much needed in the world of global
change research. That 'something' is not ever more integrated, accurate analysis of dynamic, coupled
human-environment interactions - as if we live in just one world requiring ever more 'joined-up' and
granular description, explanation and prediction. Instead, it is an approach to research that eschews
ontological holism, epistemological monism and the fact-value dualism. This approach suggests that
taking the human dimensions of environmental change seriously requires a new kind of global change
research that is at once overtly political and intellectually plural. Far from being a charter for 'bias' or
'relativism', I show that this approach expresses the rich senses of responsibility, accountability and
representation contained in the version of a new social contract I advocate here. A wider implication of
my argument is that Geography needs new stories about the nature and merits of 'intra-disciplinarity',
ones better attuned to the role of research in fostering democracy in our 'post-normal' times. Thinking
afresh about how research should influence society promises to alter many geographers' sense of self
while usefully repurposing global change research across several disciplines.
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Geography and the new social contract for global
change research
Noel Castree*
Abstract: Anxious about the failure of decision makers to significantly reduce ‘the human impact’
on Earth, many global change researchers are looking for ways and means to influence public policy,
business strategy and civil society more strongly. As part of this, there is a greater emphasis on
understanding and altering the ‘human dimensions’ of global environmental change. A number of
physical and society-environment geographers are involved in this endeavour, building on some
valuable past achievements. But what lies ahead? I address this question by examining the rich idea of
a ‘social contract’ – one little used in disciplinary debates about Geography’s past, present and future,
but now relatively common in certain wider discussions of anthropogenic global change. I suggest
that there are currents of thinking in contemporary Geography that can offer something both new
and much needed in the world of global change research. That ‘something’ is not ever more
integrated, accurate analysis of dynamic, coupled human-environment interactions – as if we live in
just one world requiring ever more ‘joined-up’ and granular description, explanation and prediction.
Instead, it is an approach to research that eschews ontological holism, epistemological monism and
the fact-value dualism. This approach suggests that taking the human dimensions of environmental
change seriously requires a new kind of global change research that is at once overtly political and
intellectually plural. Far from being a charter for ‘bias’ or ‘relativism’, I show that this approach
expresses the rich senses of responsibility, accountability and representation contained in the
version of a new social contract I advocate here. A wider implication of my argument is that
Geography needs new stories about the nature and merits of ‘intra-disciplinarity’, ones better
attuned to the role of research in fostering democracy in our ‘post-normal’ times. Thinking afresh
about how research should influence society promises to alter many geographers’ sense of self while
usefully repurposing global change research across several disciplines.
Keywords: global change research; geoscience; interdisciplinarity; social contract; democracy;
representation; post-normal inquiry

Introduction
Global change research (hereafter GCR) is a multi-disciplinary endeavour of
considerable size and complexity. It includes, but extends well beyond,
inquiries into anthropogenic climate change. Though far from unified, its
practitioners, networks and organisations share a common determination to
understand and alter the escalating ‘human impact’ on Earth – with a particular
emphasis on global and regional scale effects. GCR is currently morphing
intellectually and institutionally in response to the ‘sustainability gap’. Leading
researchers have called on their peers to reformat and repurpose GCR so that
it more effectively influences politics, business and civil society. Their concern
is that action to arrest and adapt to global environmental change has been, and
remains, woefully inadequate. As we will see, they hope that a more ‘decision-
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relevant’ GCR focussed more on ‘human dimensions’ can foster timely and
appropriate responses to current and predicted planetary changes. 1
These calls for a different modus operandi among global change researchers
have found institutional expression in new research programmes and advisory
bodies – notably Future Earth (effective from 2015) and the Intergovernmental
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES, operational since
2013). The former assimilates and redirects research previously conducted
under the auspices of three of the four long-standing international GCR
programmes (namely, DIVERSITAS, the International Geosphere-Biosphere
Programme [IGBP], and the International Human Dimensions Programme
[IHDP]).2 The latter is the new high-level science advisory body that, with
respect to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, is broadly analogous to the longestablished Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 3
This paper critically analyses the changes afoot in some of the networks and
organisations that comprise important parts of GCR today. While I agree that
business-as-usual is not an option, I believe the sort of alterations imagined to
be desirable by leading practitioners fall short of those that are ultimately
called for in light of humanity’s planetary-scale impacts. I make the case by
challenging recent arguments for a ‘new social contract’ between global change
researchers and their various stakeholders. These arguments recall earlier
attempts in Anglophone history to codify the relationship between science and
society. The notion of a new social contract is a potentially powerful framing
device that can speak to all manner of global change researchers across the
1

Let me emphasise that because what I am calling GCR is a large, multi-disciplinary and complex enterprise, the
calls for change I focus on in this paper emanate only from certain people and places - even though they are
intended to have a wide application across this field of fields. This said, these calls echo those being made by
those who call themselves ‘sustainability scientists’ and who together constitute a sizeable part of the GCR
community (see note 11 below). Though geographer Robert Kates is a founding figure of sustainability science,
surprisingly few global change researchers in the discipline of geography advertise themselves in this way. This
is a key reason why the calls for change I choose to review in the first half of this paper do not emanate from
sustainability science, despite this science’s obvious relevance to geographers working on anthropogenic global
change. In sum, when I use the acronym GCR in this paper I am not seeking to homogenise or generalise. GCR
is a generic descriptor and here I focus on some recent, prominent contours of the wider landscape.
2
The World Climate Research Programme, which has direct links to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, will continue as a separate enterprise. However, it will maintain direct links with Future Earth. In
effect, Future Earth replaces the Earth System Science Partnership that has linked the four global
environmental change research programmes since the early 2000s. However, its declared mission will focus far
more squarely on both ‘human dimensions’ and ‘useable knowledge’ than the ESSP did.
3
The IBPES was inspired not only by the IPCC but also by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2001-5) and
before that the Global Biodiversity Assessment (UNEP, 1995). Both of these were conducted under the
auspices of the United Nations. The IPBES is a direct response to the failure of signatories to the 1992 UN
Convention on Biological Diversity to address the progressive loss of terrestrial and marine diversity since the
first Earth Summit.
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disciplines and those their investigations are designed to serve. However, I
claim that it is mobilised in an overly restricted way by certain thought-leaders
in CGR. A genuinely new conception of a ‘new social contract’, I will argue,
provides a strong intellectual platform that might support ‘styles’ of GCR
different to those that currently dominate this multidisciplinary enterprise.
These alternative styles are flourishing in Geography, though are rarely present
in the many engagements to-date between geographers and the wider
networks and institutions of GCR. They speak to a form of intradisciplinarity
very different to that underpinning recurrent arguments – in this journal and
elsewhere – for Geography to be less of a house divided. As I will explain,
while they are germane to wider calls for more integrated and relevant
knowledge in GCR, they also speak to a different social contract than that
presumed desirable by certain global change researchers. This contract gives
knowledge-in-the-service of deliberation and choice (aka ‘democracy’) parity of
esteem with knowledge-in-the-service of action (aka ‘decision’). In my view, it
better recognises the true profundity for humans and non-humans of the
planetary changes many global change researchers have worked so hard to
bring to our collective attention.
In sum, this paper offers a constructive appraisal of important shifts afoot in
GCR with reference to some recent research on the society-environment
interface within Geography. As such, it explores how GCR might speak to
geographers as well as how geographers might speak back to GCR going
forward. My argument builds on those I have made in several recent articles
(Castree, 2015a; 2015b; Castree et al. 2014). The key difference is that the
present paper focuses centrally on the concept of a new contract between
GCR and society. By unpacking this concept, I hope to provide a robust
intellectual case for pushing the boundaries of GCR further than they might
otherwise be pushed. Geographers will, I hope, see how my own reading of
the concept offers a rationale for alternative forms of engagement with GCR
predicated on a new sense of why the dis/unity of our discipline is
advantageous.
The paper begins by detailing the intellectual and institutional shifts unfolding in
key parts of GCR. It then explores the notion of a new social contract that has
been used by some global change researchers to characterise the why and
wherefore of these shifts. In the next two sections I turn to Geography,
3

highlighting some recent instances of research that speak to this wider
conception. Finally, I show how these examples, and my vision of a new social
contract for GCR, challenge long-standing narratives about the value of a less
fragmented discipline (re)centred on the analysis of human-environment
relationships. The result, I hope, is an essay that offers a fresh perspective on
the relationships between geographers and GCR.

The changing composition of global change research
Background
Before detailing some of the most recent and ongoing changes occurring in
GCR, it is useful to offer some history. This will allow readers to understand
why these changes are being proposed and, in some respects, already
implemented – making this an especially formative moment in the life of GCR.
Though research into planetary scale biophysical changes goes back many
decades, only in the last thirty years has there been a concerted (and growing)
focus on Earth-wide alterations caused by human actions. ‘Global change
research’ examines anthropogenic impacts on the atmosphere, biosphere,
cryosphere, hydrosphere, and lithosphere. It aspires to variously describe,
explain, and predict these impacts at the planetary or regional scales, taking
account of spatial-temporal variations and focussing on linkages between
spheres. Though most emphasis since the early 1990s has been on physical
dimensions, GCR also examines actual and possible human responses to global
environmental change. Indeed, the need to investigate (and influence) these
‘human dimensions’ has become more important as various geoscientists have
revealed the unprecedented scale, scope and magnitude of people’s collective
impact on Earth.
GCR is almost entirely located in organisations that are government-funded or
perform a public function. It has been led by environmental scientists (and is
often called ‘global change science’ for this reason). Aside from various
universities, examples of the latter are the National Center for Atmospheric
Research (NCAR) and NASA in the USA, several Max Plank Institutes in
Germany, the UK’s Met Office and Australia’s CSIRO. Over the decades GCR
has benefitted from various forms of national support – evidenced, for example,
in the multi-sited, multi-disciplinary research of the UK Tyndall Centre (whose
original funding came from the Natural Environment Research Council, the
Economic and Social Research Council, and the Engineering and Physical
4

Sciences Research Council). It has also benefitted from the international
cooperation and exchange fostered by the World Climate Research
Programme (WCRP, est. 1980), the IGBP (est. 1986), the IHDP (est. 1990, relaunched in 1996), DIVERSITAS (est. 1991) and the Earth System Science
Partnership (ESSP) that connected the quartet between 2002 and 2012. Aside
from these programmes and the ESSP, there have been complementary
regional initiatives such as START (global change SysTem Analysis, Research &
Training, est. in 1992 and focused on Africa and the Asia-Pacific region) and the
IAI (Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research, est. 1992). Finally,
GCR has benefitted from national and multinational investments in improved
and integrated Earth observation technologies. For instance, among others
there is the Global Climate Observing System (est. 1992) and, more recently,
GEO (the Group on Earth Observations, est. 2005) – with a new European
Union Sentinel satellite system unfolding.4 One result of all this is that GCR has
dedicated research outlets, such as the peer review journals Current Opinion in
Environmental Sustainability (est. 2009), Global Environmental Change (est. 1990),
Earth’s Future (est. 2013) and Anthropocene Review (est. 2014).5
Variously feeding into and emerging from these forms of financial and
infrastructural support, certain research institutes and centres have become
intellectual hotspots of GCR. Some are long-established, some relatively new.
For instance, aside from Tyndall (est. 2000), there is the Potsdam Institute for
Climate Impact Research (est. 1992), the National Center for Atmospheric
Research (est. 1960) and the Stockholm Resilience Centre (est. 2007).
However, these physical locations aside, the four international GCR
programmes, the ESSP and the IPCC have enabled international research
alliances to emerge. These comprise both occasional and more sustained
collaborations between far-flung global change researchers. For instance,
courtesy of the IGBP the Nobel Prize winning atmospheric chemist Paul
Crutzen has worked on several occasions with leading American-Australian
climate scientist Will Steffen (e.g. see Steffen et al., 2011). The IPCC, to take
another example, inspired the creation of the Integrated Assessment
Consortium in 2007 (http://www.globalchange.umd.edu/iamc/home/). These
hotspots and alliances have not only focused on basic research into
4

A full list of global change research programmes and networks, of Earth observation systems and networks
and national scale GCR programs can be found on the IBGP website at:
http://www.igbp.net/networks.4.d8b4c3c12bf3be638a80001067.html
5
This said, GCR is widely reported in all manner of established disciplinary and interdisciplinary journals, such
as Science, Nature, BioScience and PNAS.
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anthropogenic environmental change. On the contrary, global and national links
with public policy have long characterized some parts of GCR – most
obviously in the area of anthropogenic climate change. Aside from the IPCC,
the short-lived Climate Commission in Australia (2011-13) and the UK
Committee on Climate Change (est. 2008) are examples of climatic research
findings feeding into expert advisory organizations designed to inform
governmental decision-making.
It is against this background – at once intellectual, financial, infrastructural and
institutional – that GCR is now undergoing change. The changes do not apply
equally and everywhere: GCR is far more complex than indicated in the potted
history provided above. 6 However, the changes are cascading through
significant nodes and networks within GCR, with institutional backing from the
likes of the International Council for Science (ICSU), the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP) and the Belmont Forum of national funding
agencies (est. 2009). As we will see in the following sub-sections, these changes
reflect a shared concern among many global change researchers: namely, that
the content, aims and reporting of their research has not thus far enabled
politicians, business leaders and civil society actors to respond with sufficient
speed and seriousness to the enormous challenges presented by anthropogenic
environmental change. As Nathan Sayre and co-authors put it, “Changing the
role of [global change] science is necessary but not sufficient to meet the
challenges before us – the practices of [the] science must also change” (2013:
339, emphasis added). For this reason, recent calls for alterations to the
professional habits of global change researchers have focused on three things.
Change 1: better communication
A number of global change researchers, and those with a direct stake in GCR,
have focused on the quality of communication with those constituencies the
research stands to influence. This has several aspects. First, some have
6

A detailed survey of GCR has yet to be written. The recent overview offered by Harold Mooney and others
(2013) is usefully wide-ranging, as is that presented by Ignaciuk et al. (2012) – but both are all too brief and
exclude ‘sustainability science’ (see note 1 above and . Almost all of the more detailed accounts of GCR focus
on particular parts of the wider enterprise, whether they be authored by ‘insiders’ (e.g. Liverman & Roman
Cuesta, 2008) or by ‘outsiders’ (e.g. Uhrqvist, 2015). One definitional challenge is to determine where GCR
now begins and where it shades into other forms of environmental and society-nature inquiry. Mooney et al.
(2013) include projects conducted within the four global change research programmes, ‘sustainability science’
and that conducted by members of the Resilience Alliance. But one could stretch even this ecumenical
definition. For instance, research into biophysical hazards and associated human disasters precedes GCR in
Mooney et al.’s sense of the latter. However, because anthropogenic environmental change amplifies some
‘natural’ hazards, the vibrant, multi-disciplinary field of study that examines the causes, consequences and
responses of/to hazards is now bleeding into the networks and institutions of GCR.
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enjoined their peers to resist diluting the hard-hitting implications of scientific
findings about anthropogenic environmental change. For instance, in a recent
Nature article on climate advisors, Oliver Geden (2015) argues that anxiety
about being seen as irrelevant by politicians has led too many advisors to
relinquish intellectual independence in favour of pragmatism. This echoes the
claims of the Tyndall Centre’s Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows writing in
Nature Climate Change. They argue strongly that researchers have a
responsibility to communicate their insights “clearly, honestly and without fear”
(2012: 640; see also Anderson, 2015). Secondly, others have focussed on
communicating GCR to non-academic stakeholders in ways that are very, very
clear. Reflecting on the IPCC ‘summaries for policy-makers’, Richard Black
laments their length and technicality given they are intended for “time poor
generalists who spend virtually all of their working lives outside the climate
research ‘bubble’” (2015: 282). Relatedly, David Rose (2014) urges global
change researchers to become more literate about the needs of policy makers
when deciding how to frame evidence. Meanwhile, Christa Clapp and
colleagues (2015) identify important gaps in the climate science-private sector
relationship, focussing on green bonds. “The burden is on us researchers”,
they argue, “to clearly communicate climate risk and potential implications to
investors” (p. 85).
Focussing on science-policy links outside institutions like the IPCC and IPBES,
Anthony Barnosky and collaborators have shouldered this burden in the hope
of inspiring others. They recently authored a ‘Scientific Consensus Statement
on Maintaining Humanity’s Life Support Systems in the 21st Century’ (Barnosky
et al. 2014a). Released in May 2013, it was targeted at policy makers – with
former California Governor Jerry Brown a willing intermediary to get the
Statement taken seriously elsewhere (for lessons learned see Barnosky et al.,
2014b). This example speaks to a third aspect of communication preoccupying
some global change researchers: namely, the need to connect directly with
non-academic constituencies even in the absence of established institutions like
the IPCC. Adam Corner and Chris Groves (2014) suggest that new hybrid
organisations should be created to facilitate such connection. Neither science
advisory bodies nor politically-partisan think tanks, these organisations would
“be explicitly tasked with carving-out a new space between the normative
tenets of scientific research and public engagement” (p. 744). In Corner and
Groves’ vision, they would allow global change researchers to maintain
7

academic integrity while connecting their findings to a range of political-ethical
visions of preferable social and environmental arrangements (see also Rapley &
De Meyer, 2014).
Change 2: a move beyond ‘physical dimensions’
Because it is now clear that the physical dimensions of environmental change
will profoundly shape the human future, a number of urgent calls have been
issued to make social science much more central to GCR. A particularly
prominent one has come from the ISSC (International Social Science Council)
in its third World Social Science Report, entitled Changing Global Environments
(ISSC & UNESCO, 2013). This came on the heels of the ISSC’s manifesto
Transformative cornerstones of social science research for global change (Hackmann
& St. Clair, 2012), which noted that “the focus has fallen sharply on the social
sciences, with natural scientists, sponsors and funders alike calling for more
social science, better social science and, very importantly, for more attention
to global change challenges from mainstream social science disciplines” (p. 9).
In a distillation of messages contained in the report and this manifesto,
Hackmann et al. (2014: 654) recently declared that “The social sciences must
help to fundamentally reframe … environmental change as a social, rather than
physical, problem”.
Some in the worlds of environmental science and environmental policy have
also made the case for including more environmentally-focused social science
in GCR. Writing in Science, Phillip Sharp and Alan Leshner of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science call on scientists “to operate in
fundamentally new ways” (2014: 579) to meet the ‘grand challenges’ of our
time. For them ‘covergence science’ is needed that will “integrate …
knowledge from the life, physical, social and economic sciences and engineering”
(ibid.). Chris Weaver, of the US Environmental Protection Agency, phrases this
in terms of ‘knowledge co-production’ in a recent co-authored article in Nature
Climate Change. Weaver and his colleagues suggest that “Co-framing of both
basic and applied research questions from multiple perspectives is not yet the
norm in global change research, but it is essential if we are to move forward …”
(Weaver et al., 2014: 658).
Sharp, Leshner and Weaver et al. regard improved use of environmental social
science as a key way in which GCR can reorient itself towards the ‘context of
application’ so as to meet the emerging needs of governments, businesses and
8

civic actors. In the detail, this can mean a number of things. For some
environmental scientists it is about filling knowledge gaps so as to improve the
predictive power of Earth system models, thus helping governments plan for
the future (e.g. Moss et al., 2010; Palmer and Smith, 2014). For some
environmental social scientists it is about gaps elsewhere. For instance, Ben
Sovacool and co-authors (2015) argue that ‘adaptation projects’ are too often
designed without a close attention to social power, inequality and struggle.
Relatedly, Klaus Eisenack et al. (2014) argue that the generic concept of
‘adaptation barriers’ needs operationalising through more detailed case study
work in different contexts. 7
These various attempts to show the centrality of social science to GCR reveal
contrasting understandings of how to relate to the ‘context of application’. For
some – especially environmental scientists and those on the ‘science’ end of
the social science spectrum – the relationship resembles something like Roger
Pielke’s (2007) ‘honest broker’. Through more seamless integration between
STEM subjects and social science, global change researchers can illuminate the
varied implications for humanity and its societies of different environmental
scenarios (see, for instance, Kraucunas et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2015; Tavoni and
Levin, 2014). These scenarios permit consideration of possible ensembles of
pre-emptive and adaptive technological, financial and behavioural measures at
the global, national and local scales. By contrast, commentators like Heide
Hackmann – former executive director of the ISSC and now a senior figure in
the ICS – gesture towards a more robust relationship with the context of
application. For Hackmann (and various of her recent co-authors), making
social science more central to GCR is about helping modern societies
7

These and other claims have sometimes been made in the context of promoting the relevance of whole
disciplines to global change researchers. Jessica Barnes et al. (2013) have made the case for anthropology,
focussing on its capacity to disclose interpretive knowledge and cultural diversity – both hugely relevant to
understanding the way impacts of and responses to environmental change are registered cognitively, ethically
and practically. More recently, Susan Clayton et al. (2015) argue that psychology can help GCR become more
relevant because it best understands ‘what works’ in terms of (i) communicating environmental change to
people, (ii) changing human behaviour, and (iii) helping people adapt to environmental change (see also Carrico
et al., 2015). Though both of these advocacy documents promote a rather different sense of ‘human
dimensions’, they are underpinned by a shared concern that only select parts of social science have thus far
featured in GCR. As David Victor (2015) notes, this is evident in successive IPCC assessment reports, where
social science insights have been disproportionately furnished by mainstream economics (see also Carey et al.,
2014). Victor argues that such prominence prevents working groups II and III of the Panel from properly
addressing important societal questions, such as who should bear the true costs of environmental change and
whose values will count the most.
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transform themselves by challenging policies and practices that sustain our fossil
fuel dependent, high-consuming way of life. This implies a more catalytic and
political role for GCR, making practitioners at one level ‘issue advocates’
whose normative agenda extends beyond simply ‘speaking truth to power’
(Pielke, 2007).
Change 3: a move towards ‘actionable research’
As the previous paragraph made clear, many global change researchers want its
knowledge to be more ‘decision-relevant’, ‘actionable’, ‘user-focused’ and
‘practice-relevant’ than ever before (for additional examples see: Aerts et al.,
2014; Chapin et al., 2011; Mace, 2013; Moss et al., 2013; Palmer, 2012;
Sivapalan et al., 2014; Stern et al., 2013). Roman Seidl et al. (2012) call this
science with society rather simply science for it (see also Mauser et al., 2013).
Depending on who you read, this reflects a concern that (i) too much GCR has
been fundamental rather than applied, that (ii) potentially applied research – an
example being the design and use of integrated assessment models – has often
missed out key data and variables directly relevant to policy discussions, or
that (iii) ostensibly ‘policy relevant’ knowledge is too often presented in overly
general ways. Looking forward, it is abundantly clear that GCR will be socially
and environmentally consequential this century in ways that physics, chemistry,
medicine, biology, computer science and engineering were in the 20th. Many
global change researchers want to anticipate and shape these consequences by
routinely reaching-out beyond the academy.
At the highest political level this is already occurring via the United Nations.
The likes of Johan Rockström – co-creator of the ‘planetary boundaries’
concept (Rockström, J. et al., 2009) – have shaped the content of the new
‘Sustainable Development Goals’ (agreed by the UN in late 2015). Relatedly, he
and other global change researchers engaged directly with international policy
makers at the Our Common Future Under Climate Change conference held in
Paris in July 2015 (http://www.commonfuture-paris2015.org/). However, at
more local and regional scales, Ruth DeFries, Paul Crutzen and colleagues
(2012: 604) envisage research that focuses “… proactively on solutions that
are tractable and specific to particular circumstances …”. After all, the ‘human
dimensions’ of global change are ultimately place-based in terms of impacts and
responses. One key role that social science can perform here is to help global
change researchers learn lessons about how and when ‘relevance’ is achieved
(on which see the review by Kirchhoff et al., 2013).
10

Change 4: new institutions for a new phase of GCR
The sentiments being expressed under the three headings listed above are
hardly new; similar things have been said in print and at various GCR meetings
going back years. 8 However, never have so many global change researchers
articulated these common concerns at once, most especially senior
researchers with direct links to funding agencies, government departments and
other stakeholders. Through the nodes and networks described earlier, these
researchers have helped to refashion key parts of the wider institutional
landscape that sustains GCR.
Central to this is the earlier mentioned Future Earth initiative
(http://www.futureearth.org/). It assimilates three of the four global change
research programmes. It has high-level support globally. 9 Its transition team
was led by Rockström and the geographer Diana Liverman (2013). It hopes to
foster “a new type of science that links disciplines, knowledge systems and
societal partners to support a more agile global innovation system” (Future
Earth, 2014). Two of its three overarching research themes are ‘Global
development’ and ‘Transformations towards sustainability’. These indicate a
serious desire to make social science’s centrality to GCR more than just
rhetoric. Aspirations to co-design projects with stakeholders and offer
‘decision support’ will, it is hoped, make GCR relevant to an unprecedented
degree.10 The ‘Transformations’ theme evidences a particular wish to make at
least some global change researchers significant change-agents outside the
universities they call home. It is very likely that Future Earth will set the tone
for many national level GCR programmes in the immediate future. For instance,
in the US the new National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center (SESYNC) –
part-funded by the National Science Foundation – echoes some of the Future
Earth agenda.

8

For instance, Paul Stern et al. edited a manifesto-like book on ‘human dimensions’ of global environmental
change back in 1992. A number of claims and suggestions in that collection anticipate those summarised in the
previous three sub-sections.
9
It is sponsored by the Science and Technology Alliance for Global Sustainability, the ICSU, the ISSC, the
Belmont Forum of national funding agencies, the new Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN),
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP), the United Nations University (UNU), and the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO). Future Earth emerged out of a visioning process sponsored by the ICSU and ISSC
(ICSU, 2010). It was initiated in 2009 with a ‘task team’ comprised of Johan Rockström, Walter Reid, Heide
Hackmann, Khotso Mokhele, Elinor Oström, Kari Raivio, Hans Schellnhuber and Anne Whyte.
10
Interestingly, the long established CGIAR – the Consortium on Agricultural Research – also underwent a
greater shift towards user needs in 2009.
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Future Earth aside, the new IBPES also appears to have an appetite for novel
practices. For instance, its new conceptual framework aims to accommodate
non-Western knowledge systems rather than presuming the universal
applicability of the ‘ecosystem services’ concept (see Diaz et al. 2015; Borie &
Hulme, 2015). What is more, ecological economics will probably have more
clout in the Panel than the sort of environmental economics promoted by
Nicholas Stern (2015) and others. It is also highly likely that working groups II
and III of the IPCC will enjoy greater prominence in future, in part by
furnishing more concrete knowledge about the impacts of climate change and
possible human responses. Relatedly, some are calling for a new global advisory
body covering oceanic ecosystems and fisheries that would, presumably, need
to place ‘behaviour change’ at the very heart of its normative agenda (see
Maury et al., 2013).
In sum, in terms of both funding and institutional support, GCR now appears
to be in a position to make good on some of the declared hopes and wishes of
numerous practitioners. It is becoming less dominated by various
environmental sciences and less focused on basic research, with a relative
increase in social science and ‘user relevant’ inquiry.11

A new social contract for global change research
On several occasions in recent years, some of the hoped-for and emerging
changes in GCR – detailed above – have been phrased in terms of a ‘new
social contract’ (or, now and then, ‘compact’ – see below). The use of this
evocative concept is no accident. It recalls a keynote lecture, and subsequent
paper in Science, by zoologist Jane Lubchenco (1998). Lubchenco was coauthor of an earlier Science article (Vitousek, et al., 1997) in which she claimed
that we now “live on a human-dominated planet” (p. 494). Building on this, her
new social contract paper called for a reorientation of STEM subjects12 towards
analysing and helping to solve the most pressing socio-environmental problems
of the day. Her watchwords were ‘privilege’ and ‘responsibility’. In her view,
publicly funded science (based largely in universities) needed to become more
responsive to the needs of the societies sustaining it financially. Scientists
should not so much surrender their much valued academic freedom (a
11

As I mentioned in note 1 above, the calls for change to GCR summarised in the previous pages find an echo
among those who call themselves ‘sustainability scientists’. For recent examples see the special issues of the
journal Sustainability Science published in 2012 (as Supplement 1 of volume 7) and 2014 (as issue 3 of volume 9,
entitled ‘New directions in sustainability science’).
12
STEM stands for science, technology, engineering and medicine.
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privilege) as use it differently (a responsibility) so that their discoveries and
inventions dovetailed with political, commercial and civic imperatives. This
science-society contract would be ‘new’ because, at least in the United States,
it would reset science’s compass away from research that fed into the Cold
War ambitions of successive governments after 1945. It would also hew
towards the principles of international openness and exchange that, in Robert
Merton’s (1942) version, helped ensure the ‘universality’ of science. 13
Eighteen years after Luchenco’s paper was published, her vision of a new social
contract appeals to many global change researchers. Several groups have
invoked the term, the implication being that Lubchenco’s vision has yet to be
realised. It was used in the Stockholm Memorandum, a document that came
out of the 3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium on Global Sustainability and was
presented to the United Nations High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability in
2011; it was cited by Carl Folke and co-authors in a programmatic paper
entitled ‘Reconnecting the biosphere’ (2011), published in Ambio; that same
year it was in the title of a flagship report by the German Advisory Council on
Global Change, chaired by Hans Joachim Schellnhuber (WBGU, 2011); it was
also in the title of a multi-authored 2012 manifesto by DeFries and others in
the journal BioScience; it was a key ingredient of the 2012 State of the Planet
Declaration, a strategic statement that emerged from the ESSP prior to the
Rio+20 Earth Summit (Brito & Stafford-Smith, 2012); it featured in the
introduction to a theme issue of Current Opinion on Environment & Sustainability
focused on changes to the ESSP (Stafford-Smith et al., 2012); it was
foregrounded in a recent commentary in the journal Eos (Hooke, 2015); and
finally it was mentioned in a recent Nature Geoscience article by Lubchenco and
others about ‘science for sustainability’ (Lubchenco et al., 2015).
A robust and resilient heuristic
That many senior global change researchers have invoked the idea of a NSC as
a way of framing their desire for a different kind of GCR is hardly surprising. It
remains “a robust and resilient heuristic” (Guston, 1992: 1) because it has
13

Lubcheno’s essay appeared the same year as a parallel statement by Paul Hoyningen-Huene et al. (1998)
which trailed the 1999 World Conference on Science, whose theme was a new social contract for science.
Because her argument was normative, and intended as a plenary intervention, Lubchenco did not consider the
possibility that more than one ‘contract’ might be present in university-society relations – on which see
Slaughter and Rhoades (2005). Moreover, because her argument was intentionally general it did not unpack the
content of her preferred version of the contract. Compare this with Michael Gibbons’ (1999) more detailed
account in the pages of Nature. Gibbons is one of those who promoted the idea of ‘mode 2’ knowledge as a
way of describing a new paradigm for science-society relations (Gibbons et al., 1994).
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historical pedigree, is encompassing, is motivational and is founded on several
recognized concepts.14 The pedigree is very much American. The ‘social
contract for science’ idea is linked with a post-1945 federal government
decision to fund STEM subjects generously: high levels of academic
independence were guaranteed so long as a stream of technical innovations
ultimately emerged from basic research, benefitting the state, commerce and
the public alike. Because America was the world’s scientific powerhouse after
World War II, the social contract for science idea became widely known
internationally. Electrical engineer Vannevar Bush’s (1945) seminal report
Science: the endless frontier is usually said to originate it (though, in fact, he did
not use the term). 15
The social contract idea for science is encompassing. It describes a relationship
between ‘society’ (i.e. government, business and civil society) and the academic
community. Academics who receive reliable funding from society (e.g. in the
form of research grants) reciprocate by being professional and productive.
Even if they do not know the societal benefits of their research at the outset,
at least some research will eventually pay social dividends (e.g. by underpinning
new health treatments for citizens or by identifying hitherto unknown physical
risks to communities). This description of a two-way relationship is
motivational for the parties involved because it is based on established
concepts that have a semantic weight to them. The first two are delegation and
trust. Governments, acting on behalf of society, delegate the task of producing
knowledge (and technology) to experts who are trusted to use their time and
resources well drive by a thirst for enlightenment. The third and fourth
concepts are accountability and responsibility: researchers can regulate their
own behaviour and standards (e.g. through peer review of publications), but at
least some of their activities must be responsive to known and emerging
societal agendas. These agendas may be political (e.g. national security),
commercial (e.g. developing effective and affordable renewable energy
technologies) or cultural (e.g. enriching citizens by providing greater knowledge
of the history of the universe). Overall, the utility of the social contract for
14

My sense is that the historical pedigree of the term is a key reason some GCR researchers have used it, as
opposed to equally rich but more historically recent ideas like ‘post-normal science’ or ‘Mode 2’ research.
15
This said, several elements of Bush’s vision were already present in British science-society relations courtesy
of politician Richard Burton Haldane (1854-1928). He was central to the reform of university funding in the
First World War period. The so-called ‘Haldane principle’ describes the right of scientists to determine their
own questions, topics and methods, with independent research funding bodies acting as buffers against direct
governmental interference.
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science idea is that it challenges the myth that research can ever occur ‘for its
own sake’. Publicly funded science, in the broadest sense, is defined
contextually relative to specific institutional and financial relationships that have
been constructed in modern nation states. 16
The need to fill an empty signifier
There exists a small but rich literature on the history and intellectual basis of
the social contract for science (Guston, 1992; Guston, 2000; Hessels et al.,
2009; Krishna, 2014; Raman & Mohr, 2014; Stokes, 1997; Sunkel, 2015). There
exists a far larger, and extraordinarily stimulating, literature on the changing
relations between universities, government, business and civil society. Here
terms like ‘mode 2’ knowledge, ‘post-normal’ science, ‘academic capitalism’,
‘science with society’, and ‘responsible innovation’ compete to frame
understandings of how 21st century societies seek to influence and value
university (and wider government-funded) research (and teaching). Yet, despite
the pleas for a new social contract by some leading GCR practitioners, only
one of the publications cited above says anything of substance about what this
might mean (WGBU, 2011). Ironically, what the German Advisory Council
does say barely relates to GCR. Instead, it calls for shared responsibility for
making a rapid transition to a low carbon between citizens, researchers, and
business, with a set of cooperative ‘pro-active’ states at the global helm. In this
context, GCR is presented as a means to research and overcome barriers to
achieving a ‘Great Transformation’ (see pp. 325-35). But the very general vision
of ‘transformational research’ offered is not anchored in any detailed
discussion of a new social contract for science. As for the other publications –
like the State of the Planet Declaration – the reasoning behind the calls for a
NSC do not reach beyond the need to identify global and local ‘solutions’ to
urgent ‘problems’ like accelerating biodiversity decline.
This was Lubchenco’s approach. Implicitly, the argument is that GCR is
compelled to become more socially relevant and interdisciplinary not only
because it is publicly funded but because humanity (present and future) is facing
unprecedented socio-environmental challenges in areas like food supply, sea
16

The concept of a ‘social contract’ emerged as part of the European Enlightenment, when a set of postmonarchical states founded on the principles of democracy began to replace societies dominated by unelected
elites. Different versions of the concept were presented at length (for instance, by Jean-Jacques Rousseau).
What they had in common was a desire to identify the principles on which peaceable relations could be
established between citizens and rulers, individuals and the wider society of which they formed a part. There is
neither space nor need to me to expand on the different versions of the social contract idea in this paper.
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level rise and so on. Here, then, researchers have new responsibilities to use
their expertise in the service of society, meaning accountability must now
operate as much outside as within professional academic networks.
While this logic is absolutely fine as far as it goes, there are some vital missing
ingredients. As I will now explain, adding-in these ingredients does more than
provide substance to the notion of a new social contract for global change
research; it also stands to alter the practices of many global change researchers
if this notion is taken seriously in the years immediately ahead. In other words,
these ingredients may alter some practitioners’ sense of why better
communicated, more integrated and more ‘actionable’ GCR is now necessary.
They push the idea of a new social contract beyond the ‘common sense’
reasoning implicit in those recent publications where global change researchers
have used it in their calls for change.
GCR in the service of who, and towards which ends?
As noted above, responsibility and accountability are two pivotal concepts
underpinning any argument for a new contract for GCR. But their importance
is diminished if they are not understood in direct relation to the concepts (and
practices) of representation and democracy.17 In simple terms, a new social
contract that misses this relation is likely to foster GCR that is good at
fostering action in response to pressing risks and threats, as well as manifest
opportunities (Jim Proctor [2013: 88] calls this the ‘facts-and-action’ approach).
But in order to know what ‘problems’ mean for different societies (and
communities) and what the full range of responses considered to be feasible
and desirable are, GCR will need to both seriously engender and internalise
societal deliberation. What does this mean and why does it matter?
If contemporary humans are in a ‘no-analogue’ situation environmentallyspeaking, and if global change researchers must now focus more on ‘human
dimensions’ accordingly, then these researchers will necessarily become
‘representatives’ in a sense that is as much political as epistemological.
17

I will not offer a technical discussion of either concept here. In simple terms, representation is a simultaneous
act of delimitation (framing) and substitution (standing-in for). It occurs in diverse walks of life, from the law
through to science. It has been the focus of some extremely rich conceptual and historical research across a
number of disciplines, from politics to cultural studies. Democracy, meanwhile, is that ensemble of institutions
and practices designed to enable members of a political community articulate their views on matters of private
and public consequence such that these matters can be debated and actions taken on the basis of mature
dialogue among the interlocutors. Democracy operates through a plethora of organisations, stretching from
parliaments to a free press. Again, it has been comprehensively researched and debated across numerous
disciplines, in both positive and normative terms.
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Representation is a vital but highly complex component of modern life. For
decades, the majority of GCR has tried to represent Earth surface changes,
thereby ‘speaking of’ and ‘speaking for’ actual and predicted biophysical
realities. But the more GCR explores how (i) these changes impact on people
and (ii) how people ought to respond (in the short, medium- and long-term),
the more the embeddedness of GCR in values-based discussions will become
apparent. This is because people – as culturally diverse interpretive creatures
capable of self-reflection and change – have ‘needs’ and ‘wants’ that are varied
and contested. It is also because people exist in power-laden social
relationships ordered at different spatio-temporal scales: these relationships
are equally contested, and whether they endure, or alter profoundly, affects
which ‘needs’ and ‘wants’ GCR will acknowledge and seek to serve.
Fortunately, and despite all its significant shortcomings in practice, democracy
is the one apparatus we have to-hand that can open-up these questions about
whose needs and wants should condition GCR’s sense of which ‘problems’ and
‘solutions’ seem most relevant globally and at smaller scales. If a new kind of
GCR is to be socially ‘accountable’ and ‘responsible’ then it will surely have to
work hard to represent socio-cultural variety and foster debate in a world of
chronic inequality. Because it cannot represent the ‘realities’ of the fictive
entity we call ‘humanity’ it will, instead, have to represent differentiated and
disputed patterns of human-environment relations at different scales.
This task speaks to the critical social sciences (and humanities) which have
played a fairly limited role in GCR to-date. It challenges the presumption,
common in parts of GCR, that there is one world ‘out there’ awaiting more
complete analysis such that ‘suitable actions’ can then be recommended to
governments, firms and communities at any given scale. On the contrary, which
environmental and social ‘facts’ count, and what their normative implications
are, depends significantly on how ‘reality’ is framed in any encounter between
global change researchers and their various stakeholders. The same applies to
practical ‘solutions’. Atmospheric geoengineering is a good example: whether
this is a ‘rational’ response or an act of hubris depends on far more than some
‘objective’ measurement of risk that we can all agree on. Meta-physical and
emotional questions arise about how science and technology perpetuate or
challenge certain worldviews about ‘nature’, life, time, and so on. It turn, these
worldviews implicate different human practices, relationships and institutions
(i.e. material worlds actual and possible).
17

The encounter between GCR and society will need to be both broad and
sustained to ensure accountable and responsive research, even as the urgency
of environmental change creates stresses and anxieties for all involved. As
parts of the World Social Science (ISSC & UNESCO, 2013) report rightly
argued, if we live in a ‘game changing’ moment in human history, GCR needs to
promote the idea that there is more than one game and many legitimate
pathways of change (cf. Leach et al., 2010). This will necessarily politicise GCR.
Yet to pretend neutrality is absurd given the high-stakes character of
worldwide environmental change. 18 One consequence is that the long-standing
model of creating science-advisory bodies (like the IPCC) will need to be
supplemented by organizations that allow GCR to bring vital ‘human
dimensions’ into the arena of ‘evidence-based decision-making’. These
dimensions pertain to things like faith, hope, charity, justice, rights,
entitlements, obligations, conceptions of nature and so on. After all, ‘solutions’
cannot be defined with reference to biophysical actualities or probabilities
alone. Indeed, they will be far more legitimate and effective in practice if they
emerge from a rich process of dialogue.
Science as a servant of diversity, deliberation and decision in extrascientific contexts
This hard-wiring of research to democracy has been advocated by several STS
(science and technology studies) scholars in different contexts. Global change
researchers seeking to change their modus operandi would do well to consult
their writings. Here certain writings by Andy Stirling (2012) and Steve Fuller
(2000) can serve, all too briefly, as illustrative examples from the literature.
Taking the case of the biosciences, Stirling makes the case for engagement with
stakeholders as a means of explicitly opening-up choices about what
researchers should focus their energies on, how and with what practical
consequences. The biosciences have been heavily politicised by non-scientists
in the last 20 years (and have been commercially driven in many cases, as with
agro-food firms selling genetically modified seeds). For Stirling, substantive
‘upstream’ engagement with society would explore the varied moral, cultural
18

One of the very unfortunate aspects of the recent politics-science linkage in GCR is the way climate change
sceptics have framed politics as both negative and a deformation of ‘good science’. This has had a chilling effect
on many global change researchers, especially in the US, and further entrenched a science-politics division that
has always been illusory anyway. It has impeded an open and constructive discussion of science’s necessary
implication in ways of life that are saturated with values-based decisions about right and wrong, good and bad,
etc.
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and even spiritual consequences of choices about possible (consequential) lines
of organized bioscientific inquiry. Decisions about what to investigate toward
which ends would have to be justified with reference to more than putatively
objective ‘imperatives’ existing in society or environment. This is because too
much bioscientific research (and technology) is high-stakes to be framed
narrowly in terms of ‘risks’ or ‘breakthrough medical treatments’.
In his brilliant book The governance of science, Fuller (2000) places an argument
like Stirling’s in a broader political context. Defining science in the widest sense,
Fuller notes that it is, in effect, “… a representative body in which the few
speak for the many … Yet there is no parliament of scientists … [It follows
that] science governs and is governed without being formally constituted as a
government …” (p. 8). Given the enormous size and scale of research today
(publicly funded, charitably funded and privately funded), Fuller makes the case
for a new constitution for science. In his civic republic vision, the institutions
and practitioners of science must internalise the values of participation,
plurality, and disagreement that ought to characterise a properly functioning
democracy. For him science has the capacity to deform these values, a negative
instance of what Sheila Jasanoff (2004) calls the ‘co-production’ of knowledge
and socio-environmental order. In Fuller’s view, a responsive, accountable and
representative science would foster the co-production of diversity, antagonism
and change not hegemony and marginalisation.19 In the present case, the
absence of such research threatens to co-produce and sustain a capitalist, neoliberal order that inflicts considerable socio-environmental harm and is
opposed by millions of people worldwide.

Geography and the repurposing of global change research
I earlier identified three elements of incipient change to GCR and, in the
previous section, contextualised them in calls for a new social contract. I have
suggested that these calls unduly limit the role GCR can and should play in the
wider society. My argument is that the accountability and responsibility of
researchers – two classic pillars of the social contract for science – should be
linked to the practices of representation and democracy, thus fusing the
epistemic with the political dimensions of human existence. In light of these
19

The political philosophers of science Philip Kitcher and Mark Brown are also insistent that the lifeblood of
science emanates from and flows into democracy, an argument likewise made by Bruno Latour in his Politics of
nature (2004). Within science and technology studies, questions of science and democracy have been explored
in rich and ultimately quite pragmatic ways by Silvio Funtowitz and Jerome Ravetz in a string of highly cited
publications (see Carrozza, 2015 for an excellent, recent summary).
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arguments, let me now turn – at last – to Geography. The question I want to
pose is: what resources exist in the discipline to foster the sort of new social
contract I have argued for? However, before I answer it is important to do two
things: first, acknowledge the contributions that certain geographers have made
to GCR and, second, consider their published suggestions for reconfiguring the
Geography-GCR relationship.
Global change researchers in Geography
While I can only highlight one or two contributions here (see below), the
following people are among those who have more than occasional involvement
in GCR: Eric Lambin, Billie Lee Turner II, Diana Liverman, William Solecki, John
Barnett, Susanne Moser, Neil Adger, Katrina Brown, Mark Pelling, Kirstin Dow,
Tim Lenton, Frans Berkhout, Richard Aspinall, Bill Adams, John Dearing, Karen
Seto, Thomas Downing, Mike Hulme, Robin Leichenko, Martin Parry, Colin
Polsky, Tom Wilbanks, Mark Rounsevell, Petra Tschakert and Karen O’Brien.
Not all of these self-identify as ‘geographers’, but they are almost all trained as
geographers or else based in academic units where Geography is the main or
partial umbrella for research and teaching. 20 Their relationships to GCR vary
according to their academic training, interests, networks and the funding they
have secured.
Some of their involvements have been formative. For instance, Turner and
Lambin have been central to the development of ‘land change science’ through
their role in projects organised by the IGBP and IHDP. 21 Land change science
“seeks to understand the array of forcing functions affecting land management,
including proximate and distal factors or those immediately and indirectly
linked to land-use and land-cover outcomes” (Robbins and Turner II, 2008:
299). It employs mixed methods and variety of data types (quantitative and
qualitative), tacking between local and extra-local scales. It is integrative of
techniques, evidence and modes of reasoning. Meanwhile Tim Lenton, to take a
different example, is an Earth system scientist who has helped to advance the
concept of ‘planetary boundaries’ (see Rockström et al., 2009). Diana Liverman
20

For example, Wilbanks – after many years in Geography – is now positioned elsewhere. This leads me to
observe that many other geographers are also contributing to global change science in locations outside
Geography. These include geoscience, environmental science, ecology, and environmental management
departments or centres. It’s also important to note that many physical geographers are contributing directly
and indirectly through their research, even if they are not formally part of things like the IPCC or projects
linked with the IGBP, DIVERSITAS, the WCRP or the IHDP. Many examples can be found in the field of
Quaternary science.
21
Notably the Land Use and Land-Cover Change project which was a ‘wide bandwidth’ attempt to describe
and explain patterns of terrestrial land change.
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also lent her name to the concept (ibid.), and has been a key person in the
GCAFS project of the ESSP. GCAFS stands for Global Environmental Change
and Food Systems. Running for a decade (2001-11), its aim was to “to
determine strategies to cope with the impacts of global environmental change
on food systems and to assess the environmental and socio-economic
consequences of adaptive responses aimed at improving food security”
(http://www.gecafs.org/, accessed June 20th 2015). It is also worth noting that (i)
Liverman was a co-author of the earlier mentioned DeFries et al. paper that
promoted the idea of a new social contract for GCR, and (ii) was coordinating
co-author of the Future Earth initial research plan (Rockström & Liverman,
2013).
Critical reflections on GCR born of experience
These involvements aside, some participating geographers have had occasion
to stand back and reflect critically on those parts of GCR they know well (for
examples see: O’Brien and Barnett, 2013; Liverman & Roman Cuesta, 2008;
Manuel-Navarrete, 2014). Such interventions usefully point to areas where
ongoing research in Geography could make its presence better felt in GCR.
They typically identify gaps in the current conceptual, methodological,
evidential or normative toolkit of GCR. For instance, Tschakert (2013) makes
the case for more political ecology in climate change research and response, as
does the collection edited by Brannstrom and Vadjunec (2013) which focuses
on land change science (see also Turner II & Robbins, 2008; Munroe et al.,
2013). However, the effect is rather piecemeal. What is generally missing is: (i)
a wider sense of what various other areas of Geography might contribute to
GCR, and (ii) a persuasive argument for why researchers in these areas might
want to alter the intellectual climate prevailing in large parts of GCR. Recent
articles by Karen O’Brien – a geographer with IPCC experience and who has
so far been important in the Future Earth initiative – are exceptions that prove
the proverbial rule.
O’Brien has made a series of stirring calls for global change researchers to
radicalise their understanding of how far and to what ends they need to alter
their practices (O’Brien, 2011; 2012; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c). These writings are,
in part, inspired by her prior involvement in an EU project entitled RESCUE
(which stands for Responses to Environmental and Societal Challenges for our
Unstable Earth: see O’Brien et al. 2013). But they are also informed by her
links through the ISSC to the Transformative cornerstones report and the agenda
21

outlined in the 2013 World Social Science Report. 22 Her concern is that the
changes currently called for in GCR are far too conservative. In one
contribution she makes critical reference to arguments for a NSC. “The gap
between knowledge and action (to address global environmental change)”,
O’Brien argues, “is unlikely to be addressed by a new contract between
science and society. Instead, the science of global change may itself need to
change [more deeply] i.e. to become more reflective about its own
assumptions …, including those relating to how change comes about” (2013a:
588).
O’Brien’s point, building on Kegan & Lahey’s (2009) book Immunity to change, is
that researchers need to attack their own intellectual ‘immune systems’ so as to
better foster far-reaching changes in the wider society. Though she says little
about accountability, responsibility, representation or democracy, it is clear she
sees the role of GCR as helping identifying real choices for responding for the
epic challenges global change will throw-up. To have choices you need diversity;
to register diversity you need to recognise the partiality of your own framing
of reality (cognitively, morally and aesthetically); to decide what to do
practically you need to relate and compare alternatives, harnessing research to
varied understandings of the actual, the possible, the probable and the
desirable.23 This is all the more important when power asymmetries – including
those within the worlds of knowledge production (i.e. universities, think tanks,
government research organisations etc.) – would otherwise favour certain
frames over others.
Geography’s future contributions to GCR
In a previous article O’Brien makes much of Geography’s potential to inject
new thinking into GCR (O’Brien, 2011). However, in her more recent piece
on ‘real’ as opposed to ‘superficial’ change, she is more ambivalent. On the one
hand, she commends human geographers for exploring ‘human dimensions’ for
22

Similar links have likewise informed Susanne Moser’s gradual move towards a call for transformative GCR in
recent years. Moser is a member of Future Earth’s science committee and thus a potentially important person
for both GCR and for Geography’s relation to it looking ahead.
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Many GCR researchers are already adept at creating sophisticated socio-economic scenarios at different
spatio-temporal scales. However, these are currently dominated by a scientific-rationalist framing in which
assumptions about future states of society are plugged-in to biophysical models, with the aim of representing
possible futures accurately. In this paper I am referring to engagements with stakeholders that do more than
examine a range of possibilities based on current or projected ‘realities’. A more dialogical, political approach
to thinking about the present and the possible future opens-up bigger questions of values, means and ends and
positions GCR as a vehicle for representing the factual and practical implications of qualitatively different
framings of today and tomorrow.
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too long bracketed in much GCR outside the discipline. But on the other hand,
she worries that geographers are “complicit in the perpetuation of paradigms
that contribute to continued global environmental change …” (2013: 594).
Though she names no names, the implication is that at least some of her own
previous research, and that of other geographers already involved in GCR,
could do with a shake-up.24 But the additional implication is that many
geographers not currently involved in GCR need to step-forward. Her
arguments thus make claims on two constituencies in Geography, the second
much larger than the first.
It seems to me that examples of alternative styles of research commensurate
with O’Brien’s – and my own – sense of a truly different kind of GCR exist in
Geography today. That she does not cite any rather limits the force of her
otherwise inspirational arguments. Hardly any of these examples arise out of
formal engagement with the research plans, programmes, institutional nodes or
international networks that make-up GCR. However, they offer
demonstration-cases that a different modus operandi for global change
researchers (be they geographers or not) is possible. They might also inspire
belief that geographers not much involved in GCR may have something of real
value to offer the enterprise. I will highlight just three examples below (space
prevents me from summarising more). They speak to the three elements of
change to GCR detailed earlier; together, they also speak to my sense of an
NSC driven by a commitment to democracy, responsibility, accountability,
diversity and choice in a world full of threats, inequities, cultural plurality,
uncertainty, risk and opportunity.
I believe the reason examples like these exist in Geography is simple enough.
The discipline’s long-standing intellectual heterodoxy – which is linked to the
way it spans environmental science, social science and the humanities – has
created the preconditions for novel thinking and practice. As one leading
historian sagely notes, real change arises from wider and deeper exchange:
“The more exchange, the more change. Inter[-group] … contacts do not just
24

O’Brien’s argument here can be read in one of two ways. The first is that geographers’ academic freedom
and university location, while useful, keeps them at a distance from new social movements and other
constituencies who serve to remind us (if we pay attention) of the gravity of our global situation. The second is
that geographers have been co-opted by the wider currents of neoliberal thinking, resting content to
occasionally criticise these currents (as I myself have done in print on several occasions) without going beyond
such scholarly acts of protest. Regardless, in one of her recent pieces (2013c) she offers some autobiographical
reflections on her own journey towards a deeper questioning of her ‘taken-for-granteds’ as a researcher. It
makes for an inspiring read.
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re-shake the kaleidoscope of the world; they also multiply the crystals it
contains” (Fernández-Armesto, in Radcliffe et al., 2010: 111). Contemporary
Geography has been productive of such kaleidoscopic multiplication,
sometimes framed negatively as a symptom of a ‘divided discipline’ that lacks
sufficient intellectual unity. I will challenge this framing in the final section of
this paper, but first let’s consider those three cases of positive syncretism.
Though two involve consideration of ‘indigenous knowledge’, their wider
implications extend beyond these specific instances of cultural specificity.

Leading and learning by example: towards a different style
of GCR
Responsibility, accountability and representation in communicating
research: ethno-linguistic translations in post-colonial Canada
Earlier, we saw that many global change researchers urgently want their
findings to be communicated in more forthright, clear (audience appropriate)
and direct (less intermediated) ways. There are a number of complexities
involved in realising these aims (what is communicated, to who, how and in
what circumstances?). However, all too often some version of the ‘linear
model’ of communication is presumed to apply. According to this model,
researchers’ job is to figure-out how their findings can be properly registered
and recognised by various constituencies, leading to some of sort cognitive,
emotional and ultimately behavioural response.25 Researchers are thereby
responsive and accountable to ‘reality’ and aim to represent certain actualities
and probabilities to a range of social actors. Recent research by Emilie
Cameron, Rebecca Mearns and Janet Tamalik McGrath (2015) help us think
differently about the means and ends of communicating environmental
research in our ‘post-normal’ times. It emerges from a fruitful combination of
cultural geography, area studies and a concern with climate adaptation.
Cameron et al. (2015) analyse a glossary of climate-change related terms used
in Nunavut (in arctic Canada) from 2005 (Government of Nunavut and
Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, 2005). The glossary translated Anglophone
concepts such as ‘adaptation’ and ‘resilience’ – now staples in GCR and in
climate policy – into Inuktitut (one of five Inuit dialects). Its aim was to enhance
public literacy about climate change and how it might impact (is already
impacting) indigenous communities in the Canadian north (most Nunavutians
25

Indeed, the academic field of environmental communication – which is dedicated to analysing the practice –
has for years been dominated by a focus on ‘what works?’ and what does not
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do not use English as a first language). From the perspective of global change
researchers it appears to be a vehicle for clear and direct communication with
‘stakeholders’. In this light, the principal challenge might appear to be ensuring
‘accurate’ translation into Inuktitut. The fact that the glossary emerged out of
dialogue with various elders across Nunavut would appear to have ensured
such accuracy.
However, Cameron et al. show how deceptive appearances can be. They begin
by noting the particularities of Inuktitut. In this language, English-language terms
translate in descriptive, flexible, contextual and relational ways – meanings are
therefore fluid and only solidify through dialogue and use in indigenous
societies over time. They go on to identify two key elements of the wider
context in which translated terms from the glossary make sense. One is the
long history of dispossession and cultural imperialism that indigenous peoples
across Canada have suffered since British and French settlers arrived four
centuries ago. The other, far more recent, is an increasing emphasis in
Anglophone climate research and policy on adaptation and far less on
mitigation. Here anthropogenic climate change is framed as a biophysical
problem calling for locally and regionally specific responses to things like sea
level rise. These two elements of context are germane to the meaning of the
glossary because, Cameron et al. show, they key-in to quite different
cosmological aspects of indigenous culture in circumpolar Canada.
Consider the term ‘climate change’. In the glossary this is defined as an
environmental process, consistent with how many climate scientists define it;
the human ‘drivers’ are not incorporated into the definition. In Inuktitut it
translates to silaup asijjiqpallianinga. Sila is a key notion in Inuit society, meaning
something like ‘life’: it is an encompassing notion, describing the immanent and
transcendent dimensions of existence. In this context, ‘climate change’ is
unremarkable if defined as a process of change to sila since Inuit culture
accepts the idea that the world is in flux. However, if it is defined more
expansively to include its causes (e.g. intentional pollution of the global
atmosphere) it could tap-into an ethically and politically charged understanding
of sila in Inuit society. That understanding regards abuse of sila as a question of
justice and healing. By contrast, understanding climate change as one aspect of
ongoing alterations to sila calls forth values of patience, resilience and creativity.
These values fit well with a research and policy agenda that emphasises people
‘coping’ with climate change rather than addressing its root causes in political
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economy and global geopolitics. However, the values called forth by a
perceived abuse of sila frame that agenda as a profound disrespect for Inuit
frameworks of law and as a continuation of colonial power by other means.
This has very different normative implications, both morally and practically,
than the notion of silaup asijjiqpallianinga does.
In sum, using a case of inter-cultural exchange, Cameron et al. demonstrate
that acts of ostensibly clear and direct environmental communication come
freighted with some heavy baggage. ‘Accurate’ definition and translation are
shown, in practice, to blur the lines between facts and values, cognition and
emotion. In itself, this is not a problem. The authors’ point is that
communicating information about society-environment interactions is
unavoidably political. This does not mean it is presented dishonestly or in bad
faith (though that can happen, of course). But it does mean that research-based
communication must be transparent about its own normative commitments
and how they articulate with audiences who may not share them.
Forms and goals of more interdisciplinary research: a novel collaboration
in the United States
We saw earlier that many global change researchers are calling for more and
better collaboration between STEM subjects and the social sciences so as to
bring ‘human dimensions’ more fulsomely into GCR. Many of these calls, I
showed, are predicated on the idea of knowledge gaps. The assumption is that
social scientists can help environmental scientists better understand how
people are impacted by environmental change and how people can (or might
wish to) respond. Identifying the ‘missing dimensions’ will, in turn, presumably
help global change researchers identify suitable socio-environmental
interventions according to the real world context (financial, cultural, political
etc.). However, this vision of a more interdisciplinary GCR threatens to leave
key intellectual norms unchallenged. One norm is the belief there is one (albeit
complex and differentiated) world out there awaiting discovery if the right
ensemble of concepts, methods and data is utilised. As Andrew Barry and
Georgina Born (2013: 10-11) argue, this supports an ‘additive’ form of
interdisciplinary research that has ‘integration-synthesis’ as its goal.26 By
contrast, Hackmann and associates’ call for something more radical gestures
towards what Barry and Born call an “ontological logic” (ibid. 17). Here GCR
26

This is not the place to parse the meanings of ‘interdisciplinarity’ ‘cross-disciplinarity’, multi-disciplinarity’ and
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would aim to change both that which it analyses and also itself, iteratively,
thereby being more than a metaphorical mirror that takes certain socioenvironmental realities as ontologically given. But what might this mean in
practice? Though not about global environmental change, recent research by a
set of America biogeographers led by Elizabeth Baron provides food for
thought. This is because it engages field ecology, laboratory analysis, qualitative
methods and ‘stakeholder’ consultation in unconventional ways.
Barron et al. focus on how morel mushrooms are classified. Wild edibles,
morels are highly valued in some indigenous societies and land-based
communities but also in mainstream American society (and beyond). Questions
arise about how best to manage the ecosystems in which morels grow. For
decades, Western scientists have sought to classify morels according to
universal criteria, be they morphological or, in recent times, genetic. However,
local communities have detailed knowledge of morels based on
intergenerational experiences of foraging for and harvesting them. Though not
scientific knowledge, it has nonetheless proven useful for scientists trying to
characterise morels with appropriate granularity. Moreover, the trend of
natural resource management towards community involvement means that this
knowledge ought to be considered for practical and ethical reasons too.
A standard social science approach to local knowledge – including the
knowledge of morels in the mid-Atlantic region Barron et al. work in – would
seek to accurately record it using surveys, interviews and ‘walk alongs’ with
foragers. This information would then, to the extent possible, be combined
with field- and laboratory-based scientific information about morels to create a
more complete understanding of mycological variety and ecosystem context.
This, in turn, has management implications. However, Barron et al. identify two
problems with this approach. First, it preserves a traditional division of labour
where social scientists get asked to speak for people, while science is left to
self-described scientists (as if it has no social dimensions pertinent to the
content of scientific knowledge). Second, this approach thereby maintains a
power imbalance, where local knowledge does not enjoy parity of esteem with
science because science is equated with truth (as opposed to custom and
practice) and neutrality (as opposed to interests).
Given this, Barron et al. choose to treat scientific inquiry into morels and local
understandings of them as equally human, contingent and specific practices.
27

This means that an interdisciplinary approach involves far more than
connecting together pieces of knowledge about the world ‘out there’. It must
also involve being interdisciplinary about the process of producing both
biophysical and social knowledge. Specifically, Barron et al. refuse to treat
mycological science as immune to the insights of social studies of science and
technology (SSK, including research into the historical geographies of science
by David Livingstone and others). In itself this is hardly new. But the authors go
on to explore knowledge-making practices in a novel way. They ‘perform’
mycological knowledge symmetrically, treating their own practices as trained
scientists as no more epistemically valid than the local foragers whose
knowledge they take to be no more value-based than is scientific knowledge. In
the first case the values of universalism and abstraction are key, while in the
second case use- and customary-values prevail (linked to a respect for placespecificity). By foregrounding the rival contexts in which certain kinds of
knowledge count and come to matter, Barron et al. show us that ‘integrated’
inquiry cannot naively hope to ‘join the dots’ from a position outside that
which it analyses. If research is a social enterprise through-and-through, then
collaborations across the ‘human-physical’ divide cannot fail to question
established divisions of academic labour and the ontological distinctions they
uphold. Barron et al. see their role as recognising – and acting on – the
relativity of knowledge to specific contexts, values and goals. Interdisciplinary
research here stakes a claim to engendering specific states of affairs, framing
the real in ways intended to have effects whose justification is variously moral,
political and even aesthetic. In the mid-Atlantic context, that can mean
subordinating scientific understanding to knowledge that dovetails with local
peoples’ traditions and aspirations. Relatedly, it can mean allowing science to
be subject to the claims of critical, reflexive social science (embodied, in our
own discipline, in the recent calls for ‘critical physical geography’ by Rebecca
Lave and others)
Barron et al.’s approach demonstrates a rich sense of what responsiveness,
accountability and representation might look like in a more interdisciplinary
GCR, governed by a commitment to innovation and participation when
identifying issues and responses. Ultimately, the big challenges that global
change throws-up must be addressed locally and nationally. However, scalingup the sort of place-based interdisciplinary research of Barron et al. to address
global level issues will itself be a challenge.
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Actionable research for whom? Bringing politics into ‘relevant’ knowledge
without compromising academic integrity in New Zealand
Earlier we saw that that many global change researchers are calling for more
‘decision-relevant’ GCR. However, these calls typically leave the meaning of
‘relevance’ unexamined – whether the context is informing government
decision-making or assisting a local community in its water resource husbandry.
What the two examples above show is that ‘relevant knowledge’ can serve
either to encourage reform of that which it depicts or to foster something
more catalytic and contested. The latter may strike some global change
researchers – especially those in the environmental and earth sciences – as a
risky act of ‘playing politics with science’. This is understandable given the
perennial problems modern societies have experienced of seeing either (i)
science politicised (as happened during the ‘Glacier-’ and ‘Climate-gate’
incidents of 2009-10) or (ii) politics scientised (as with the notorious response
of the UK Conservative government to the outbreak of the BSE crisis in 1987).
However, what the two examples above show us is that research can be
conducted with integrity and rigour while still being alive to the ‘context of
implication’. More than context-appropriate ‘application’, knowledge in GCR
and other fields supports particular interests and desires that should not be
screened-out in any attempt to justify its utility. 27 To pretend that socioenvironmental research can separate its practical implications from cognitive
acts of description, explanation, prediction or scenario-building is ultimately
dishonest. The organic connection ought to openly acknowledge both
‘upstream’ of research and ‘downstream’ of it as well.
A third example shows us why, echoing Barron et al.’s point about the
contextual character of knowledge in its many forms. Marc Tadaki and Jim
Sinner (2014) argue forcefully that all research about people and the
environments they utilise contains value judgements that warrant scrutiny. This
includes scientific and social scientific research equally. Tadaki and Sinner
analyse the implementation of the River Values Assessment Systems (RiVAS).
This is a fairly recent attempt, by New Zealand water professionals, to make
the different ways in which water is valuable explicit and transparent by
connecting environmental and social data. Tadaki and Sinner reveal that, in
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Of course, there are rich traditions in critical social science of ‘activist’ and ‘engaged’ inquiry that attest to
this. I suspect that those global change researchers who happen to be aware of these traditions might not (yet)
recognise their relevance to their own endeavours as researchers. In Geography the awareness ought to be
higher because of the real and metaphorical proximity of physical geographers to their human counterparts.
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their desire to capture stakeholders’ plural valuations of freshwater, these
professionals use their own value-set in determining what societal values are
admissible in the System’s analytical machinery. This makes them political
actors not merely epistemic conduits of socio-hydrological realities.
Since the 1990s New Zealand ecologists and conservation planners have been
legally obliged to produce composite measures of the quality of river systems.
The systems can then be ranked comparatively. In recent years, regional
governments have been tasked with identifying people’s valuations of these
systems to aid decisions about managing the quality and quantity on freshwater.
Again, these valuations referenced nationally. This has necessitated a technique
of capturing them in a standardised form in disparate parts of New Zealand.
The result was (and is) an ostensibly holistic mapping of both biophysical and
social values by mixing physical science and social science methods. The
resulting knowledge has direct management implications and ‘relevance’.
However, Tadaki and Sinner demonstrate two notable things. First, the RiVAS
only captured one kind of ‘value’. They call this ‘contribution to a goal’. For
example, the System asks people how much a river is valued as a place to
canoe or dive. The second is that this decision to exclude methods to record
other ways people might value rivers – Tadaki and Sinner identity three of them
(2014: 142) – was itself a value judgement. The decision, made by water
resource professionals, presumed that rivers matter to people most as
possible means to certain instrumental or recreational ends. For this reason,
Tadaki and Sinner argue that the RiVAS does not, in fact, ‘represent’ peoples’
values but is a “value articulating institution” (p. 148, emphasis added) – this
despite its apparent commitment to ‘give voice’ to otherwise mute stakeholders. This articulating function is shielded from public scrutiny and, Tadaki
and Sinner argue, should not be.
The flaw in the System, the two argue, is the pretence to record facts and
values objectively as if the recording process is a neutral way-station to fully
informed water management cognisant of both physical and social dimensions.
Tadaki and Sinner’s aim is not about exposing ‘bias’ in the eventual hope of
objectivity. Instead, they show the need to be able to justify value judgements
involved ‘all the way down’, from society through to those who are charged
with serving its interests as researchers or analysts. Actionable knowledge
cannot separate fact from value and, despite itself, the RiVAS shows why.
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Towards new narratives about the value of Geography in
‘the age of humans’
This has been a long, rather (too?) ambitious essay, so let me draw it to a close
with a relatively short section that summarises the argument and identifies
some of its wider implications. I have shown that GCR is undergoing change
but that the alterations imagined to be necessary and desirable by some are
less fundamental than they ought, arguably, to be. By outlining a new ‘new
social contract’, I have challenged the rather conservative assumptions
underpinning some global change researchers’ calls for a shift in science-society
relationships. I have noted the long-standing, often formative, involvement of
geographers in GCR, but noted too that some involved want both GCR and
their geography colleagues to engage in mutual transformation. Finally, I have
pointed to three examples in Geography that embody aspects of the new
social contract I have argued for; these examples also show that some
geographers, even if not formally involved in GCR, are practising the sort of
research the likes of Karen O’Brien and Heide Hackmann want to see more of
in this field of fields.
The arguments and examples presented in this paper are intended to speak to
three constituencies. As I have sought to show, they are relevant to global
change researchers outside Geography (environmental and social), global
change researchers within the discipline and society-environment geographers
not much engaged with GCR so far. Given the scope of the paper I realise
there is an inevitable lack of precision in some the claims I have made about
GCR and Geography; additionally, my three examples are hardly sufficient to
speak to the full range of research conducted in GCR. Both things may
therefore limit how far I can sensibly make claims upon the trio of
constituencies just mentioned. But supposing there is some validity to the case
I have made in the previous pages, I want to end by considering what this
means for the stories that Geographers tell themselves about themselves.
All disciplines invent narratives that serve to build identity and purpose among
researchers and teachers. In Geography’s case one enduring narrative is that
geographers are ‘bridge builders’ and ‘weavers’. Many of us not only seek to
understand human-environment interactions at a range of spatio-temporal
scales (so the narrative goes); we also do so in a ‘synthetic’ way, paying close
attention to how economy, state action, community dynamics and biophysical
processes interact. According to this narrative, one of Geography’s unique
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contributions to understanding is the refusal either to study society and
environment separately or to focus on just one or other thread within the
human-nature tapestry. Over the years, the leading society journals in
Anglophone Geography have published papers by leading geographers that
perpetuate this disciplinary self-understanding. The TIBG is one (Stoddart, 1987;
Cooke, 1992; Massey, 1999), the Annals of the Association of American
Geographers another (Kates, 1987; Gober, 2000; Turner II, 2002; Skole, 2004).
While there is absolutely nothing wrong with narrating who (we think) we are,
once were, and ought in future to be, my sense – as a long-time reader of
these sorts of papers – is that they almost never question a key assumption. It
is the assumption that the world is a gigantic 3-D jigsaw and that the task of
geographers is to identify and connect the relevant pieces by combining
concepts, methods and data across our discipline’s oft-lamented ‘humanphysical divide’. This assumption’s hold was very evident in a recent call for
‘comprehensive research’ in Area by a group of geographers based in Singapore
(Zielger et al., 2013). The watchword then becomes intellectual ‘unity’. We
should somehow connect the epistemological ‘fragments’ of our discipline and
thereby make visible life’s socio-environmental fabric (where other disciplines
fixate on the threads). For many commentators, this is presented as the
difficult challenge geographers face, one that is ultimately the raison d’etre for
our subject.
Given the scale, scope and magnitude of the human impact on Earth, one can
well see the standard narrative being employed to inspire more geographers to
address global environmental change; one can also see its utility in persuading
those in other disciplines, and also research funding bodies, that Geography is a
subject of signal value whose time has come. For instance, there is plenty of
the former in Carol Harden’s (2012) recent AAAG paper, based on a plenary
lecture; and the latter is evident in the US National Research Council agendasetting report Understanding the Changing Planet: Strategic Directions for the
Geographical Sciences (2010). To my mind all this is broadly consistent with
Lubchenco’s version of a NSC, replayed in recent calls to reorient GCR. What
is not taken seriously, it seems, is the idea that geographical research is
answerable to more than just ‘truth’ (social or environmental) in a complex
and dynamic world that is often difficult to represent epistemologically.
I suggest that our narratives about the history, current condition and wider
societal value of Geography need to be rethought in light of key questions
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concerning representation, responsiveness and accountability. Revisiting the
idea of a social contract is one way to do this, and my own tack in this
particular essay (though very rare in Geography: Demeritt [2000] is almost the
lone exception). But there are plenty of other ways too. It can be done via the
notion of ‘post-normal’ research, the notion of ‘mode 2’ research, the idea of
‘knowledge regimes’ (Pestre, 2003) or the idea of ‘distributed expertise’ (Irwin,
1995).28 Regardless, the intellectual breadth and diversity of Geography comes
to be regarded differently in this context as compared to the familiar unity
narrative. The aim is less to connect ‘pieces’ of knowledge so as to mirror
ontological connections ‘out there’ and more about what Trevor Barnes and
Eric Sheppard (2010) call ‘engaged pluralism’. Engaged pluralism, as these
authors would have it, “navigat[es] … between the Scylla of multiple solitudes
and the Charybdis of monism …” (ibid. 194). In the present context, it involves
diverse collaborations between physical geographers, human geographers and
various real world actors where traditional fact-value, is-ought, object-subject
dualism are no longer sacrosanct.
Geographical research so conducted could – to use Sheila Jasanoff’s term once
more – help to ‘coproduce’ multiple realities and diversify future possibilities at
a very high-stakes moment in global history. Some geographers have made
these arguments before (e.g. Demeritt, 2009a; 2009b; Whatmore, 2013), and
examples like the three cited in this paper make good on such injunctions
practically-speaking. The positive news is that an appetite for new styles of
human-environment research alive to the ineluctable politics of knowledge is
growing in Geography. Recent calls for ‘ethnogeomorphology’ (Wilcock et al.,
2013), for ‘socio-pedology’ (Engel-Di Mauro, 2015) for ‘socio-hydrology’ (Lane,
2014) and, more broadly, for ‘critical physical geography’ (Tadaki et al. 2014)
are exciting proof of that. What sort of worldly effects would GCR have if its
many practitioners followed suit? Is GCR otherwise destined to contribute to
what some regard as our ‘post-political’ age becoming part of the proverbial
problem not the solution?
*School of Geography and Sustainable Communities, University of Wollongong, Australia
ncastree@uow.edu.au
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Though this is not the place to explore any of these rich ideas, I would argue to for too long most
publications about the ‘dis-unity’ of Geography have not benefitted from examining the discipline in light of
them. By focussing on the social contract concept I have in this paper offered one glimpse of these benefits.
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